Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption?

41 Pages Posted: 15 Sep 2014

See all articles by David Abrams

David Abrams

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Ufuk Akcigit

University of Chicago - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)

Jillian Grennan

Santa Clara University, Leavey School of Business; Santa Clara University School of Law; University of California, Berkeley, Haas School of Business, Institue for Business and Social Impact

Date Written: September 15, 2014

Abstract

Prior work suggests that more valuable patents are cited more and this view has become standard in the empirical innovation literature. Using an NPE-derived dataset with patent-specific revenues we find that the relationship of citations to value in fact forms an inverted-U, with fewer citations at the high end of value than in the middle. Since the value of patents is concentrated in those at the high end, this is a challenge to both the empirical literature and the intuition behind it. We attempt to explain this relationship with a simple model of innovation, allowing for both productive and strategic patents. We find evidence of greater use of strategic patents where it would be most expected: among corporations, in fields of rapid development, in more recent patents and where divisional and continuation applications are employed. These findings have important implications for our basic understanding of growth, innovation, and intellectual property policy.

Keywords: productive innovation, defensive innovation, patents, creative destruction, ci- tations, patent value, competition, intellectual property, entrepreneurship, strategic patenting, defensive patenting, patent thickets, fencing patents

JEL Classification: O3, L2, K1

Suggested Citation

Abrams, David S. and Akcigit, Ufuk and Grennan, Jillian, Patent Value and Citations: Creative Destruction or Strategic Disruption? (September 15, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2496598

David S. Abrams (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Ufuk Akcigit

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 E. 59th St
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.ufukakcigit.com

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Jillian Grennan

Santa Clara University, Leavey School of Business ( email )

Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States

Santa Clara University School of Law ( email )

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States

University of California, Berkeley, Haas School of Business, Institue for Business and Social Impact

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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