A Game between a Terrorist and a Passive Defender

52 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2014 Last revised: 23 Feb 2016

See all articles by Opher Baron

Opher Baron

University of Toronto - Operations Management

Oded Berman

University of Toronto - Operations Management

Arieh Gavious

Ono Academic College; Ben-Gurion University

Date Written: March 11, 2015

Abstract

In the last two decades, terrorism has become a major issue around the world. We analyze a conflict between a terrorist (Terrorist) and a passive defender (Defender) using a simple game theoretical model. Defender is passive as her actions can only influence the costs (damages) when Terrorist attacks. We consider single and multi period games. In each period, Terrorist may attack Defender who may try to prevent damage. The games take into account the available technologies for Terrorist and his potential learning. Based on the equilibrium in these games, we make several conjectures related to political events that may change the level of violence, the technology used by Terrorist, and possible cease-fire agreements. We use three sources of data on the conflict between Israel, as Defender, and terrorist groups from the Gaza strip, as Terrorist. Based on these data, we estimate parameters for the models and present numerical examples. We show that for this conflict's political situation our data do not reject our conjectures. In addition, our conjectures provide insights into long term conflicts in general.

Keywords: Game Theory, Anti-Terrorism

JEL Classification: H56, N4, C60, C70

Suggested Citation

Baron, Opher and Berman, Oded and Gavious, Arieh, A Game between a Terrorist and a Passive Defender (March 11, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2496602 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2496602

Opher Baron

University of Toronto - Operations Management ( email )

105 St. George st
Toronto, ON M5S 3E6
Canada

Oded Berman

University of Toronto - Operations Management ( email )

105 St. George st
Toronto, ON M5S 3E6
Canada

Arieh Gavious (Contact Author)

Ono Academic College ( email )

Kyriat Ono
Israel

Ben-Gurion University ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel

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