The Law is What the Arbitrator Had for Breakfast: How Income, Reputation, Justice, and Reprimand Act as Determinants of Arbitrator Behaviour

in J.C. Betancourt (ed.), Selected Topics in International Arbitration – Liber Amicorum for the 100th Anniversary of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Oxford University Press, 2014), Forthcoming.

King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 2014-36

18 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2014 Last revised: 22 Sep 2014

See all articles by Thomas Schultz

Thomas Schultz

King's College London; University of Geneva; Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) - Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement (CIDS); Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies

Robert Kovacs

University of Geneva

Date Written: September 16, 2014

Abstract

This paper examines the salient incentives and constraints that the current socio-legal system of arbitration places on arbitrators. In doing so, it mirrors the main steps taken by classical law and economics studies on judicial behaviour. It takes the main types of incentives and constraints identified in these studies and applies them to the behaviour of arbitrators. The rationale of the current study is that arbitrators, like everyone else, are maximisers of their own utility. The pursuit of that maximisation influences how they decide cases. The components of their utility are determinants of their behaviour. If we better comprehend these determinants - what influences and motivates the behaviour of arbitrators - we can better understand arbitration, and the law that applies and should apply to it, and the law created by it.

Suggested Citation

Schultz, Thomas and Kovacs, Robert, The Law is What the Arbitrator Had for Breakfast: How Income, Reputation, Justice, and Reprimand Act as Determinants of Arbitrator Behaviour (September 16, 2014). in J.C. Betancourt (ed.), Selected Topics in International Arbitration – Liber Amicorum for the 100th Anniversary of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (Oxford University Press, 2014), Forthcoming.; King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 2014-36. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2496827

Thomas Schultz (Contact Author)

King's College London ( email )

Somerset House East Wing
Strand
London, WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom

University of Geneva ( email )

102 Bd Carl-Vogt
Genève, CH - 1205
Switzerland

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) - Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement (CIDS) ( email )

Villa Moynier
Rue de Lausanne 120b
Geneva, 12011
Switzerland

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies ( email )

Geneva
Switzerland

Robert Kovacs

University of Geneva ( email )

102 Bd Carl-Vogt
Genève, CH - 1205
Switzerland

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