Political Booms, Financial Crises

52 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2014

See all articles by Helios Herrera

Helios Herrera

HEC Montreal

Guillermo Ordoñez

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Christoph Trebesch

Kiel Institute for the World Economy; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 19, 2014


We show that political booms, measured by the rise in governments’ popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies that would help prevent potential crises. We provide evidence of the relevance of this reputation mechanism.

Keywords: credit booms, reputation, financial crises, political popularity, emerging markets

JEL Classification: D82, E44, E51, E58, G01, H12, N10, N20

Suggested Citation

Herrera, Helios and Ordoñez, Guillermo and Trebesch, Christoph, Political Booms, Financial Crises (August 19, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4935, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2496870 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2496870

Helios Herrera

HEC Montreal ( email )

3000, ch. de la Côte-Ste-Catherine
Montréal, Quebec H3T 2A7

HOME PAGE: http://www.hec.ca/en/profs/helios.herrera.html

Guillermo Ordoñez

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Christoph Trebesch (Contact Author)

Kiel Institute for the World Economy ( email )

P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, Schleswig-Hosltein D-24100

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

United Kingdom

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