Governance of Banks in an Era of Regulatory Change and Declining Public Confidence

Law and Economics Yearly Review, 2014, Vol. 3, I

43 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2014

See all articles by Roger McCormick

Roger McCormick

London School of Economics - Law Department

Andrea Minto

Ca Foscari University of Venice

Date Written: September 15, 2014

Abstract

Corporate governance reforms have become more intrusive for banks than might be thought appropriate for “ordinary corporates”. “Heavier” regulation in this area is justified by the public interest at stake in bank activity and the risk to the public interest if a bank is allowed to fail (and the cost to the public of saving a bank from failure). The public interest (and the interest of all stakeholders) also has implications for the scope of the duty of care of bank directors.

Conventional concepts of corporate governance address traditional risk areas in banking activity as well as tensions such as the “agency problem” and the need for oversight by directors of senior management. However, a new set of issues related to public trust has been triggered by the LIBOR scandal and most banks, and many commentators, profess a desire to “restore public trust” and address acknowledged shortcomings in their approach to ethical questions and the soundness of their corporate culture. A related, but different, set of challenges arises as a result.

Keywords: Corporate governance, internal governance, banks, agency theory, risk management, internal control system, duty of care, organisational duty, managerial skills

JEL Classification: G32, K22, G30, M40

Suggested Citation

McCormick, Roger and Minto, Andrea, Governance of Banks in an Era of Regulatory Change and Declining Public Confidence (September 15, 2014). Law and Economics Yearly Review, 2014, Vol. 3, I, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2497321 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2497321

Roger McCormick

London School of Economics - Law Department ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Andrea Minto (Contact Author)

Ca Foscari University of Venice ( email )

Dorsoduro 3246
Venice, 30123
Italy

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