Rule of Accountability or Rule of Law? Regulating the UN Security Council's Accountability Deficits

Journal of Conflict Security Law, 19

RegNet Research Paper No. 2014/45

21 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2014 Last revised: 30 Sep 2014

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

This article examines how the attempt to pursue Security Council accountability relates to parallel efforts to strengthen the rule of law. The article argues that accountability and the rule of law are closely connected and that steps to promote one have the potential to reinforce initiatives that promote the other. The challenge for the accountability and rule of law agendas is to ensure that these closely linked waves of reform initiatives will have a cumulative impact that improves the capacity of the Security Council to act effectively and legitimately to maintain international peace and security. This means strengthening the Council’s ability not just to pursue the accountability of other actors, but to model accountability itself, and not simply to promote the rule of law elsewhere, but to respect the rule of law in and through its own decision-making process. The article traces the evolution and meaning of both the rule of law and accountability in the Security Council’s practice. It then examines the relationship between the two terms, arguing that at the end of the day they share a symbiotic relationship that is mutually reinforcing.

Keywords: United Nations Security Council, Rule of Law, Accountability, Regulating the Security Council, Regulating through the Security Council

Suggested Citation

Farrall, Jeremy Matam, Rule of Accountability or Rule of Law? Regulating the UN Security Council's Accountability Deficits (2014). Journal of Conflict Security Law, 19 , RegNet Research Paper No. 2014/45, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2497841 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2497841

Jeremy Matam Farrall (Contact Author)

ANU College of Law ( email )

5 Fellows Road
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

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