Shareholder Welfare and Substantial Share Acquisitions Outside of the Williams Act

33 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2014

See all articles by Michael D. Ryngaert

Michael D. Ryngaert

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate

Jeffry M. Netter

Department of Finance; University of Georgia Law School

David Malmquist

Citigroup, Inc.

Date Written: 1988

Abstract

We argue that non-professional shareholders are not generally harmed by open market or negotiated purchases during or shortly after the termination of a tender offer. With widespread availability of fair price amendments, share control statutes, poison pill amendments, and fair value appraisals, market sweeps should not result in unequal treatment of shareholder groups or in diminished takeover premiums, and arbitragers should not systematically receive disproportionately favorable treatment relative to other shareholders, due to the competition.

Keywords: antitakeover amendments, tender offers, market efficiency

JEL Classification: G10, G14, G18

Suggested Citation

Ryngaert, Michael David and Netter, Jeffry M. and Malmquist, David, Shareholder Welfare and Substantial Share Acquisitions Outside of the Williams Act (1988). Columbia Business Law Review, No. 2, 1998. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2499030

Michael David Ryngaert (Contact Author)

University of Florida - Department of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate ( email )

P.O. Box 117168
Gainesville, FL 32611
United States
352-392-9765 (Phone)

Jeffry M. Netter

Department of Finance ( email )

Terry College of Business
Athens, GA 30602-6253
United States
706-542-4450 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.terry.uga.edu/directory/profile/jnetter/

University of Georgia Law School

225 Herty Drive
Athens, GA 30602
United States

David Malmquist

Citigroup, Inc. ( email )

3800 Citi Group Center
Tampa, FL 33610
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
23
Abstract Views
314
PlumX Metrics