Bond v. United States: Can the President Increase Congress's Legislative Power by Entering into a Treaty?

New York University Journal of Law and Liberty, Vol. 8, pp. 228-259, 2013

33 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2014

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

The proposition that treaties can increase the power of Congress is inconsistent with the text of the Treaty Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. It is inconsistent with the fundamental structural principle that "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and limited." It implies, insidiously, that that the President and the Senate can increase their own power by treaty. And it implies, bizarrely, that the President alone -- or a foreign government alone -- can decrease Congress's power and render federal statutes unconstitutional. Finally, it creates a doubly perverse incentive: an incentive to enter into foreign entanglements simply to increase domestic legislative power.

Keywords: Congress, Legislative power, Treaty Clause, Supreme Court, statutory interpretation

JEL Classification: K00, K10, K19

Suggested Citation

Rosenkranz, Nicholas Quinn, Bond v. United States: Can the President Increase Congress's Legislative Power by Entering into a Treaty? (2013). New York University Journal of Law and Liberty, Vol. 8, pp. 228-259, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2500250

Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

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