Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective

23 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2000  

Jack Landman Goldsmith III

Harvard Law School

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

Date Written: November 2000

Abstract

Critics of realist and rational choice approaches to international law argue that if nations were motivated entirely by power or self-interest, their leaders would not make moral and legal arguments because no one would believe them. Thus, the prevalence of moral and legal rhetoric on the international stage refutes the behavioral assumptions of realism and rational choice. This paper argues that even if nations are not motivated by a desire to comply with morality or law, the use of moral and legal arguments could occur in equilibrium. Signaling and cheap talk models show that nations may engage in talk in order (1) to deflect suspicion that they have unstable political systems or adversarial interests, and (2) to coordinate when gains from coordination are available. International talk is often moral and legal because the obligational vocabulary of moral and legal dispute between individuals is also useful for purely amoral strategic interactions when cooperation and coordination are involved. The existence of moral and legal rhetoric in international relations is the result of strategic incentives, not of the desire to comply with morality or law.

JEL Classification: K0

Suggested Citation

Goldsmith, Jack Landman and Posner, Eric A., Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective (November 2000). U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 108. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=250042 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.250042

Jack Landman Goldsmith III (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

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