Declaration on Patent Protection - Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS

IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property & Competition Law, 2014, Vol. 45, Is. 6, pp 679-698

Intellectual Property Law and Policy Journal, 2014, Vol. 45, pp.1 - 32 (in Japanese)

Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-19

20 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2014 Last revised: 24 Dec 2015

See all articles by Matthias Lamping

Matthias Lamping

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Reto Hilty

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; University of Zurich; Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Dan L. Burk

University of California, Irvine School of Law

Carlos M. Correa

University of Buenos Aires (UBA) - Faculty of Social Sciences

Peter Drahos

Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS); Queen Mary University of London, School of Law; School of Regulation & Global Governance (RegNet)

N.S. Gopalakrishnan

Cochin University of Science and Technology (CUSAT)

Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Annette Kur

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Geertrui Van Overwalle

KU Leuven - Centre for IT & IP Law (CiTiP)

Jerome H. Reichman

Duke University School of Law

Hanns Ullrich

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Date Written: September 24, 2014

Abstract

As a framework regulation for innovation markets, the patent system needs to be tailored to the innovation process, which it is supposed to serve, and to the competitive environment, within which it must operate. In order to ensure an efficient functionality of the patent system as an innovation policy tool, patent rights ought to be defined, justified and continually reconsidered by reference to their socio-economic benefits and costs.

Sovereign states should retain the discretion to adopt a patent system that best suits their technological capabilities as well as their social, cultural and economic needs and priorities, with the proviso that the exercise of such discretion must remain within the boundaries of international law. Taking into account the customary principles of interpretation of international law, this Declaration seeks to shed light on these boundaries. The purpose is to clarify the policy space that the ‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (TRIPS Agreement) leaves to national legislators and judicial authorities with regard to the implementation and administration of their patent systems.

When the world’s major patent systems first developed into their present form, nation states were able to engage in the regulatory design process under conditions of high sovereign autonomy. Over the past decades, this autonomy has been progressively eroded. Today, states face a legal and institutional regime consisting of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements, which are becoming increasingly complex and set more and more limits to their regulatory freedom.

As a result, the ability of states to maintain a proper balance between the need for protection of knowledge goods in global markets, the freedom to regulate national or regional innovation markets, and the policy space for pursuing diverse public interest goals risks becoming unduly constrained. This Declaration seeks to clarify some of the regulatory options states still retain under international law, in particular the TRIPS Agreement.

Note: Downloadable document is a Preface only.

Suggested Citation

Lamping, Matthias and Hilty, Reto and Burk, Dan L. and Correa, Carlos M. and Drahos, Peter and Gopalakrishnan, N.S. and Grosse Ruse-Khan, Henning and Kur, Annette and Van Overwalle, Geertrui and Reichman, Jerome H. and Ullrich, Hanns, Declaration on Patent Protection - Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS (September 24, 2014). IIC - International Review of Intellectual Property & Competition Law, 2014, Vol. 45, Is. 6, pp 679-698 ; Intellectual Property Law and Policy Journal, 2014, Vol. 45, pp.1 - 32 (in Japanese); Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-19. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2500784 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2500784

Matthias Lamping (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

Reto Hilty

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

University of Zurich

Rämistrasse 74/7
Zürich, CH-8001
Switzerland

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Munich, 80539
Germany

Dan L. Burk

University of California, Irvine School of Law ( email )

4500 Berkeley Place
Irvine, CA 92697-1000
United States
949-824-9325 (Phone)

Carlos M. Correa

University of Buenos Aires (UBA) - Faculty of Social Sciences ( email )

Marcelo T. de Alvear Marcelo T. de Alvear 2230
Buenos Aires, C1122AAJ
Argentina

Peter Drahos

Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS) ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

Queen Mary University of London, School of Law

67-69 Lincoln’s Inn Fields
London, WC2A 3JB
United Kingdom

School of Regulation & Global Governance (RegNet) ( email )

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

N.S. Gopalakrishnan

Cochin University of Science and Technology (CUSAT) ( email )

Cochin, Kerala 682 022
India

Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Annette Kur

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Geertrui Van Overwalle

KU Leuven - Centre for IT & IP Law (CiTiP) ( email )

Sint-Michielsstraat 6 box 3443
Leuven, 3000
Belgium

HOME PAGE: https://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/en/staff/00015469

Jerome H. Reichman

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Hanns Ullrich

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

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