Leniency (Amnesty) Plus: A Building Block or a Trojan Horse?

3(2) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 391-407 (2015)

Queen's University Belfast Law Research Paper No. 10

18 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2014 Last revised: 2 Nov 2015

See all articles by Marek Martyniszyn

Marek Martyniszyn

Queen's University Belfast - School of Law

Date Written: September 1, 2014

Abstract

Leniency (amnesty) plus is one of the tools used in the fight against anticompetitive agreements. It allows a cartelist who did not manage to secure complete immunity under general leniency, to secure an additional reduction of sanctions in exchange for cooperation with the authorities with respect to operation of another prohibited agreement on an unrelated market. The instrument was developed in the US and, in recent years, it was introduced in a number of jurisdictions. This article contextualises the operation of and rationale behind leniency plus, forewarning about its potential procollusive effects and the possibility of its strategic (mis)use by cartelists. It discusses theoretical, moral, and systemic (deterrence-related) problems surrounding this tool. It also provides a comparison of leniency plus in ten jurisdictions, identifying common design flaws. This piece argues that leniency plus tends to be a problematic and poorly transplanted US legal innovation. Policy-makers considering its introduction should analyse it in light of institutional limits and local realities. Some of the regimes which already introduced it would be better off abandoning it.

Keywords: leniency, leniency plus, amnesty, immunity plus, bonus plus, antitrust law, self-reporting, competition law, deterrence, cartels, whistleblowers, enforcement, horizontal agreements, penalty plus, omnibus question

JEL Classification: K21, K42, L40, L49, L44

Suggested Citation

Martyniszyn, Marek, Leniency (Amnesty) Plus: A Building Block or a Trojan Horse? (September 1, 2014). 3(2) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 391-407 (2015); Queen's University Belfast Law Research Paper No. 10. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2500843 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2500843

Marek Martyniszyn (Contact Author)

Queen's University Belfast - School of Law ( email )

Main Site Tower
Belfast, Northern Ireland BT7 1NN
United Kingdom
+44 28.9097.3495 (Phone)
+44 28.9097.3376 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://go.qub.ac.uk/Martyniszyn

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
544
Abstract Views
2,203
rank
50,210
PlumX Metrics