Round-Robin Versus Elimination in Tournaments with a Dominant Player

45 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2014

See all articles by Alex Krumer

Alex Krumer

University of St. Gallen

Reut Megidish

Sapir Academic College

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 2014

Abstract

We study round-robin and elimination tournaments with three players where one player is dominant, i.e., he has a higher value of winning than his weaker opponents. In every stage, a pair-wise match is modelled as an all-pay auction. We demonstrate that the expected payoff of the weak players in the round-robin tournament is higher than or equal to their expected payoffs in the elimination tournament. On the other hand, the expected payoff of the dominant player in the elimination tournament could be either higher or lower than in the round-robin tournament. We also show that if a contest designer wishes to maximize the dominant player's probability to win he should organize a round-robin tournament. However, if he wishes to maximize the players' expected total effort, then if the asymmetry between the players is relatively low, he should prefer the elimination tournament, while if the asymmetry is relatively high, he should prefer the round-robin tournament.

Keywords: all-pay auctions, elimination tournaments, round-robin tournaments

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Krumer, Alex and Megidish, Reut and Sela, Aner, Round-Robin Versus Elimination in Tournaments with a Dominant Player (July 2014). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10081, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2501555

Alex Krumer (Contact Author)

University of St. Gallen ( email )

St. Gallen
Switzerland

Reut Megidish

Sapir Academic College ( email )

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2309 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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