Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2501628
 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia


Alex Edmans


London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Vivian W. Fang


University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Accounting

Katharina Lewellen


Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth

September 2014

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10145

Abstract:     
This paper links the CEO’s concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. These concerns depend on the amount of equity he intends to sell in the short-term, but actual equity sales are an endogenous decision. We use the amount of stock and options scheduled to vest in a given year as an instrument for equity sales. Such vesting is determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by current investment opportunities. An interquartile increase in instrumented equity sales is associated with a decline of 0.25% in the growth of R&D/assets, 4.6% of the average R&D/assets ratio. Vesting-induced equity sales also increase the likelihood of meeting or marginally beating analyst earnings forecasts, and are associated with higher returns to earnings announcements. More broadly, by introducing a measure of incentives that is not driven by the current contracting environment – vesting-induced equity sales – our paper suggests that CEO contracts affect real outcomes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: CEO Incentives, Managerial Myopia, Short-Termism, Vesting

JEL Classification: G31, G34, M12, M52


Date posted: September 25, 2014  

Suggested Citation

Edmans, Alex and Fang, Vivian W. and Lewellen, Katharina, Equity Vesting and Managerial Myopia (September 2014). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10145. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2501628

Contact Information

Alex Edmans (Contact Author)
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Vivian W. Fang
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Accounting ( email )
321 19th Avenue South
Room 3-109
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.vivianfang.org
Katharina Lewellen
Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-8247 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://oracle-www.dartmouth.edu/dart/groucho/tuck_faculty_and_research.faculty_profile?p_id=QE2X25
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