Storable Votes and Judicial Nominations in the U.S. Senate

38 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2014

See all articles by Alessandra Casella

Alessandra Casella

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Sébastien Turban

Columbia University

Gregory Wawro

Columbia University - Department of Political Science

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2014

Abstract

We model a procedural reform aimed at restoring a proper role for the minority in the confirmation process of judicial nominations in the U.S. Senate. We propose that nominations to the same level court be collected in periodic lists and voted upon individually with Storable Votes, allowing each senator to allocate freely a fixed number of total votes. Although each nomination is decided by simple majority, storable votes make it possible for the minority to win occasionally, but only when the relative importance its members assign to a nomination is higher than the relative importance assigned by the majority. Numerical simulations, motivated by a game theoretic model, show that under plausible assumptions a minority of 45 senators would be able to block between 20 and 35 percent of nominees. For most parameter values, the possibility of minority victories increases aggregate welfare.

Keywords: filibuster, judiciary, senate, storable votes, voting

JEL Classification: D72, H11, K4

Suggested Citation

Casella, Alessandra and Turban, Sébastien and Wawro, Gregory, Storable Votes and Judicial Nominations in the U.S. Senate (September 2014). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10158, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2501641

Alessandra Casella (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Sébastien Turban

Columbia University

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Gregory Wawro

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

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420 West 118th Street
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United States

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