Not Available For Download
Add Paper to My Library
Permalink
Using these links will ensure access to this page indefinitely
Copy URL

Corruption in Procurement: An Analysis of Contracting Modes

International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics, 13(2), April-June 2005: 283-292

Posted: 28 Sep 2014

See all articles by Rajeev K. Goel

Rajeev K. Goel

Illinois State University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 1, 2005

Abstract

This research examines corruption in government procurement by studying auctions of incentive contracts. Government officials in our framework are not actively seeking bribes but would be prone to altering behavior when offered bribes. Using a simple linear contract, we study the incentives of private contractors to offer bribes and the incidence of corruption under different contracting modes. Our results show that corruption is likely to decrease as contracts move away from fixed-price formats.

Keywords: corruption, procurement, contracts, auctions

JEL Classification: K42, D44

Suggested Citation

Goel, Rajeev K., Corruption in Procurement: An Analysis of Contracting Modes (June 1, 2005). International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics, 13(2), April-June 2005: 283-292 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2501705

Rajeev K. Goel (Contact Author)

Illinois State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Not Available For Download

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Place Job Opening

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
260
PlumX Metrics

Related eJournals