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Tax Competition and Global Background Justice

47 Pages Posted: 1 Oct 2014  

Peter Dietsch

University of Montreal

Thomas Rixen

University of Bamberg - Department of Political Science

Date Written: September 28, 2014

Abstract

Competition for mobile tax bases undermines the fiscal self-determination of states and exacerbates inequalities of income and wealth both within countries and globally. The paper provides a normative evaluation of international tax competition, and puts forward two principles of international taxation designed to both protect and circumscribe the fiscal self-determination of states. First, a membership principle, which holds that deriving the benefits of membership in any given country grounds an obligation to pay one’s taxes there. Second, a constraint on fiscal policy, ruling out fiscal arrangements that can be shown both to be based on strategic intent and to have a collectively negative outcome. We call for the establishment of an International Tax Organization (ITO) to implement these principles of global background justice in taxation.

Suggested Citation

Dietsch, Peter and Rixen, Thomas, Tax Competition and Global Background Justice (September 28, 2014). Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2502519

Peter Dietsch

University of Montreal ( email )

C.P. 6128 succursale Centre-ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada

Thomas Rixen (Contact Author)

University of Bamberg - Department of Political Science ( email )

Feldkirchenstrasse 21
96045 Bamberg
Germany

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