Procyclical and Countercyclical Fiscal Multipliers: Evidence from OECD Countries

34 Pages Posted: 30 Sep 2014 Last revised: 8 Feb 2025

See all articles by Daniel Riera-Crichton

Daniel Riera-Crichton

Bates College

Carlos A. Vegh

University of Maryland - Department of Economics; Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS); University of California at Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Guillermo Vuletin

Brookings Institution

Date Written: September 2014

Abstract

Using non-linear methods, we argue that existing estimates of government spending multipliers in expansion and recession may yield biased results by ignoring whether government spending is increasing or decreasing. In the case of OECD countries, the problem originates in the fact that, contrary to one’s priors, it is not always the case that government spending is going up in recessions (i.e., acting countercyclically). In almost as many cases, government spending is actually going down (i.e., acting procyclically). Since the economy does not respond symmetrically to government spending increases or decreases, the “true” long-run multiplier for bad times (and government spending going up) turns out to be 2.3 compared to 1.3 if we just distinguish between recession and expansion. In extreme recessions, the long-run multiplier reaches 3.1.

Suggested Citation

Riera-Crichton, Daniel and Vegh, Carlos A. and Vegh, Carlos A. and Vuletin, Guillermo, Procyclical and Countercyclical Fiscal Multipliers: Evidence from OECD Countries (September 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w20533, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2502715

Daniel Riera-Crichton (Contact Author)

Bates College ( email )

Lewiston, ME 04240
United States

Carlos A. Vegh

Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) ( email )

1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-1984
United States

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States

University of California at Los Angeles ( email )

Box 951477
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477
United States
310-825-7371 (Phone)
310-825-9528 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://vegh.sscnet.ucla.edu

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Guillermo Vuletin

Brookings Institution ( email )

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