Government Fragmentation versus Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption

Public Choice, 2011, 148(3): 471-490

Posted: 3 Oct 2014

See all articles by Rajeev K. Goel

Rajeev K. Goel

Illinois State University - Department of Economics

Michael A. Nelson

University of Akron - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

This research examines the influence of government decentralization on corruption in the United States. Previous research has focused primarily on fiscal decentralization. We address whether the structure of local governments — measured in terms of the scope of services offered and the population served — has a bearing on corruption. Results show that government decentralization does not necessarily reduce corruption — the type of decentralization matters. Specifically, more general-purpose governments contribute to corruption. In contrast, the effect of special-purpose governments is mixed. The findings uniquely reveal the tension between fiscal decentralization and fragmented local governments in terms of impacts on corruption.

Keywords: Corruption; Fiscal decentralization; Local government fragmentation; Special-purpose government; General-purpose government

JEL Classification: H73; H11

Suggested Citation

Goel, Rajeev K. and Nelson, Michael A., Government Fragmentation versus Fiscal Decentralization and Corruption (2010). Public Choice, 2011, 148(3): 471-490. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2504005

Rajeev K. Goel (Contact Author)

Illinois State University - Department of Economics ( email )

Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Michael A. Nelson

University of Akron - Department of Economics ( email )

Akron, OH 44325
United States
330-972-7939 (Phone)
330-972-5356 (Fax)

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