Invalid But Infringed? An Analysis of Germany's Bifurcated Patent Litigation System

41 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2014 Last revised: 2 May 2017

See all articles by Katrin Cremers

Katrin Cremers

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Fabian Gaessler

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Dietmar Harhoff

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition; Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Christian Helmers

Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 13, 2014

Abstract

We analyze the impact of the probabilistic nature of patents on the functioning of Germany’s bifurcated patent litigation system where infringement and validity of a patent are decided independently by different courts. We show that bifurcation creates situations in which a patent is held infringed that is subsequently invalidated. Our conservative estimates indicate that 12% of infringement cases in which the patent’s validity is challenged produce such ‘invalid but infringed’ decisions. We also show that having to challenge a patent’s validity in separate court proceedings means that more resource-constrained alleged infringers are less likely to do so. We find evidence that ‘invalid but infringed’ decisions create uncertainty which firms that were found to infringe an invalid patent attempt to reduce by filing more oppositions against newly granted patents immediately afterwards.

Keywords: Litigation, innovation, patents, bifurcation, Germany

Suggested Citation

Cremers, Katrin and Gaessler, Fabian and Harhoff, Dietmar and Helmers, Christian, Invalid But Infringed? An Analysis of Germany's Bifurcated Patent Litigation System (September 13, 2014). in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 131, Part A, 2016, pp. 218-242; Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2504507 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2504507

Katrin Cremers

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany

Fabian Gaessler (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

Dietmar Harhoff

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany
+49 89 24246 550 (Phone)
+49 89 24246 599 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ip.mpg.de

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München ( email )

Munich, 80539
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Christian Helmers

Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business ( email )

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA California 95053
United States

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid ( email )

CL. de Madrid 126
Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
261
Abstract Views
1,632
rank
107,562
PlumX Metrics