On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders

16 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2014 Last revised: 12 Apr 2017

Fei Li

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Peter Norman

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Date Written: April 11, 2017

Abstract

In a multi-sender Bayesian persuasion game, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) show that increasing the number of senders cannot decrease the amount of information revealed. They assume: (i) senders reveal information simultaneously, (ii) information can be arbitrarily correlated, and (iii) senders play pure strategies. This note constructs examples that demonstrate that adding senders can result in a loss of information if any of these assumptions is violated.

Keywords: Communication, Bayesian Persuasion, Multiple Senders, Sequential Persuasion

JEL Classification: D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Li, Fei and Norman, Peter, On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders (April 11, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2505277 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2505277

Fei Li (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill ( email )

102 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC NC 27514
United States

Peter Norman

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill ( email )

102 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC NC 27514
United States

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