The Supportive Factors of Firms’ Collusive Behavior: Empirical Evidence from Cartels in the European Union

Organization Studies, 2014, 35(6): 881-908

47 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2014 Last revised: 2 Feb 2016

See all articles by Olivier Bertrand

Olivier Bertrand

SKEMA Business School - Sophia Antipolis Campus

Fabrice Lumineau

Purdue University

Evgenia Fedorova

Saint Petersburg State University

Date Written: October 5, 2014

Abstract

While cartels can be highly detrimental to society and create important economic and social costs for different stakeholders, the literature on organization studies has focused very little on cartels to date. In particular, we still do not know much about firms’ reasons for taking part in cartels. In this study, we build on the rational choice perspective in organizational misconduct to investigate the conditions supporting firms’ collusive behavior. We organize our theoretical arguments around the factors related to motivation and opportunity. Using a sample of cartels in the European Union, our empirical analysis gives evidence for our main arguments: the propensity to participate to a cartel is supported not only by the characteristics of the firm, but also by internal factors interacting with the attributes of the environment in which the firm is embedded. Implications for firms and policy makers are discussed.

Keywords: Cartels, Organizational Misconduct, Rational Choice, Motivation-Opportunity Factors

Suggested Citation

Bertrand, Olivier and Lumineau, Fabrice and Fedorova, Evgenia, The Supportive Factors of Firms’ Collusive Behavior: Empirical Evidence from Cartels in the European Union (October 5, 2014). Organization Studies, 2014, 35(6): 881-908. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2505660

Olivier Bertrand

SKEMA Business School - Sophia Antipolis Campus ( email )

60 rue Dostoïevski
Sophia Antipolis, 06902
France

Fabrice Lumineau (Contact Author)

Purdue University ( email )

610 Purdue Mall
West Lafayette, IN 47906
United States

Evgenia Fedorova

Saint Petersburg State University ( email )

7-9, Universitetskaya nab.
Saint Petersburg, 199034
Russia

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