The Global Market for Tax & Legal Rules

51 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2014 Last revised: 16 Jun 2019

See all articles by Tsilly Dagan

Tsilly Dagan

University of Oxford, Faculty of Law; Bar Ilan University

Date Written: February 6, 2016

Abstract

The canonical literature in law and economics has argued that tax laws are more efficient than other areas of law (e.g., private law) in redistributing income. Focusing on two basic features of globalization – marketization of the state-constituent relationship and the fragmentation of sovereignty – this Article demonstrates that globalization seriously undermines this conventional wisdom.

Specifically, the electivity of legal regimes under globalization (i.e., the ability of individuals and businesses to choose the laws applicable to them or avoid application of a particular legal regime altogether) is key in determining which rule is a better candidate for efficient redistribution. Therefore, tax rules, with the many opportunities they offer for (particularly well-off) taxpayers to elect to opt out of the taxing jurisdiction, enjoy no a-priori advantage over non-tax rules as a means of redistribution.

Suggested Citation

Dagan, Tsilly, The Global Market for Tax & Legal Rules (February 6, 2016). 21 FLORIDA TAX REVIEW 148 (2017), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2506051 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2506051

Tsilly Dagan (Contact Author)

University of Oxford, Faculty of Law ( email )

St Cross Building
St Cross Rd
Oxford, OX1 3UL
United Kingdom

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Ramat Gan
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel

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