Time Pressure Increases Cooperation in Competitively Framed Social Dilemmas

Cone J, Rand DG (2014) Time pressure increases cooperation in competitively framed social dilemmas. PLoS ONE, 9 e115756

14 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2014 Last revised: 7 Jan 2015

See all articles by Jeremy Cone

Jeremy Cone

Yale University - Department of Psychology

David G. Rand

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Date Written: December 30, 2014

Abstract

What makes people willing to pay costs to benefit others? Does such cooperation require effortful self-control, or do automatic, intuitive processes favor cooperation? Time pressure has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in Public Goods Games, implying a predisposition towards cooperation. Consistent with the hypothesis that this predisposition results from the fact that cooperation is typically advantageous outside the lab, it has further been shown that the time pressure effect is undermined by prior experience playing lab games (where selfishness is the more advantageous strategy). Furthermore, a recent study (Rand, Newman, & Wurzbacher, 2014) has found that time pressure increases cooperation even in a game framed as a competition, suggesting that the time pressure effect is not the result of social norm compliance. Here, we successfully replicate this study’s findings, again observing a positive effect of time pressure on cooperation in a competitively framed game, but not when using the standard cooperative framing. These results suggest that participants’ intuitions favor cooperation rather than norm compliance, and also that simply changing the framing of the Public Goods Game is enough to make it appear novel to participants and thus to restore the time pressure effect.

Keywords: cooperation, dual process, framing, intuition, public goods, economic games

JEL Classification: C70, C79, C90, C91, C92, D64, D70, D71, H41

Suggested Citation

Cone, Jeremy and Rand, David G., Time Pressure Increases Cooperation in Competitively Framed Social Dilemmas (December 30, 2014). Cone J, Rand DG (2014) Time pressure increases cooperation in competitively framed social dilemmas. PLoS ONE, 9 e115756. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2506054 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2506054

Jeremy Cone

Yale University - Department of Psychology ( email )

P.O. Box 208205
New Haven, CT 06520-8205
United States

HOME PAGE: http://cornellpsych.org/people/jcone/

David G. Rand (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.daverand.org

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