Inefficient School Choice in a Long-Run Urban Equilibrium

44 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2014  

Ulrich Kamecke

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: September 29, 2014

Abstract

We model centralized school matching as a second stage of a simple Tiebout-model and show that the two most discussed mechanisms, the deferred acceptance and the Boston algorithm, both produce inefficient outcomes and that the Boston mechanism is more efficient than deferred acceptance. This advantage vanishes if the participants get to know their priorities before they submit their preferences. Moreover, the mechanism creates artificial social segregation at the cost of the disadvantaged if the school priorities are based on ex ante known (social) differences of the applicants.

Keywords: school choice, deffered acceptance, Boston mechanism, Tiebout-hypothesis, social seggregation

JEL Classification: C78, H42, R23

Suggested Citation

Kamecke, Ulrich, Inefficient School Choice in a Long-Run Urban Equilibrium (September 29, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4969. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2506528

Ulrich Kamecke (Contact Author)

Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Spandauer Strasse 1
D-10178 Berlin
Germany
(49)-(30)-2093 5785 (Phone)
(49)-(39)-2093 5787 (Fax)

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