Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces

Posted: 26 Jul 2001

See all articles by Joerg Oechssler

Joerg Oechssler

University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Frank Riedel

Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics

Abstract

The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this unsatisfying restriction is unnecessary. We specify a simple condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for the case of infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide new conditions for the stability of rest points and show that even strict equilibria may be unstable. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, linear-quadratic games, the harvest preemption game, and games with mixed strategies.

Keywords and Phrases: Replicator dynamics, Evolutionary stability, Continuous strategy spaces.

JEL Classification: C70, C72

Suggested Citation

Oechssler, Joerg and Riedel, Frank, Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=250655

Joerg Oechssler (Contact Author)

University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany
+49 6221 54 3548 (Phone)
+49 6221 54 3630 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.awi.uni-heidelberg.de/with2/theorie2/Team/Oechssler/Oechssler_main.html

Frank Riedel

Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics ( email )

Postfach 10 01 31
Bielefeld, D-33501
Germany

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