Mechanism Design in Queueing Problems

Posted: 26 Jul 2001

See all articles by Manipushpak Mitra

Manipushpak Mitra

University of Bonn - Institute of Economic Theory I

Abstract

A well-known result in incentive theory is that for a very broad class of decision problems, there is no mechanism which achieves truth-telling in dominant strategies, efficiency and budget balancedness (or first best implementability). On the contrary, Mitra and Sen (1998), prove that linear cost queueing problems are first best implementable. This paper is an attempt at identification of cost structures for which queueing problems are first best implementable. The broad conclusion is that, this is a fairly large class. Some of these first best implementable problems can be implemented by mechanisms that satisfy individual rationality.

Keywords: Dominant strategy incentive compatibility, Efficiency, Budget balancedness, Individual rationality.

JEL Classification: C44, C72, C78, D82

Suggested Citation

Mitra, Manipushpak, Mechanism Design in Queueing Problems. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=250683

Manipushpak Mitra (Contact Author)

University of Bonn - Institute of Economic Theory I ( email )

Adenauerallee 24-26
D-53113 Bonn
Germany

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