Performance Incentives under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia's Regions

41 Pages Posted: 8 Oct 2014 Last revised: 18 Dec 2015

See all articles by Noah Buckley

Noah Buckley

Columbia University - Department of Political Science; National Research University Higher School of Economics

Ora John Reuter

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee - Department of Political Science; National Research University Higher School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 2015

Abstract

Available evidence indicates that there is considerable variation among autocracies in the extent to which subnational officials are rewarded for economic growth. Why is economic performance used as a criterion for appointment in some autocracies but not in others? Using data on turnover among high-level economic bureaucrats in Russia’s 89 regions between 2001 and 2012, we find that performance-based appointments are more frequent in less competitive regions. In more competitive — though still autocratic — regions, the political imperatives of maintaining a political machine that can win semi-competitive elections may lead regime leaders to abandon cadre policies that promote economic development.

Suggested Citation

Buckley, Noah and Reuter, Ora John, Performance Incentives under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia's Regions (November 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2506868 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2506868

Noah Buckley (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Department of Political Science ( email )

7th Floor, International Affairs Bldg.
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Ora John Reuter

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee - Department of Political Science ( email )

PO Box 413
Milwaukee, WI 53211
United States

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
65
Abstract Views
478
rank
173,897
PlumX Metrics