The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement

Posted: 8 Oct 2014

See all articles by Jay Shimshack

Jay Shimshack

University of Virginia - Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy

Date Written: November 2014

Abstract

Without monitoring and enforcement, environmental laws are largely nonbinding guidance. Although economists and philosophers have thought seriously about the broader public enforcement of law since at least the eighteenth century, environmental monitoring and enforcement remain both understudied and controversial. This article reviews what we do and do not know about the subject. I review common environmental enforcement institutions, prescriptive and descriptive theories, empirical evidence on regulator behavior, and empirical evidence on deterrence effects.

Suggested Citation

Shimshack, Jay, The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement (November 2014). Annual Review of Resource Economics, Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp. 339-360, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2507222 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-091912-151821

Jay Shimshack (Contact Author)

University of Virginia - Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy ( email )

235 McCormick Rd.
P.O. Box 400893
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4893
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
462
PlumX Metrics