Download This PaperSupplement to a Strategic Model of Magical Thinking: Axioms and Analysis
6 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2014
Date Written: September 26, 2014
Abstract
We establish that in the Prisoners' Dilemma, the model of Daley and Sadowski (2014) is logically distinct from three models that employ well-known forms of other-regarding preferences: altruism (Ledyard, 1995; Levine, 1998), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993).
The paper "A Strategic Model of Magical Thinking: Axioms and Analysis" to which this supplement applies is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2507377
Keywords: Prisoners' dilemma, coordination games, magical thinking, cooperation
JEL Classification: C7, D8
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Sadowski, Philipp and Daley, Brendan, Supplement to a Strategic Model of Magical Thinking: Axioms and Analysis (September 26, 2014). Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 174, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2507394 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2507394
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