Exchanges Competition in Listing Services: Evidence for Italian Companies

26 Pages Posted: 9 Oct 2014

See all articles by Manuela Geranio

Manuela Geranio

Bocconi University - Department of Finance

Valter Lazzari

LIUC Università Cattaneo; SDA Bocconi School of Management

Date Written: November 2014

Abstract

Competition among stock exchanges is growing fast on trading services. Differently, competition for listing securities has so far been minimal, if not absent, especially in Europe. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the monopolistic position that many important and well‐renowned exchanges around the world still maintain on offering and pricing of listing services. We first enlighten the content of listing services. We then quantify fees applied by different exchanges to companies according to their size. We consider both initial and annual fees. Our results show that US exchanges are more expensive for medium‐sized firms whilst EU markets apply higher fees to the largest companies. Up to now, demutualisation of stock exchanges did not lead to the expected reduction of listing fees. Many exchanges, particularly in the EU, are still taking advantage of their exclusive control position by applying premium price policies to the largest companies in order to cross‐subsidise smaller companies.

Suggested Citation

Geranio, Manuela and Lazzari, Valter, Exchanges Competition in Listing Services: Evidence for Italian Companies (November 2014). Economic Notes, Vol. 43, Issue 3, pp. 283-307, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2507539 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecno.12024

Manuela Geranio (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy

Valter Lazzari

LIUC Università Cattaneo ( email )

Corso Matteotti
Castellanza (VA)
Italy
+39-0331572205 (Phone)

SDA Bocconi School of Management ( email )

Via Bocconi 8
Milan, Milan 20136
Italy
+39-3334993014 (Phone)

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