Error Prone Inference from Response Time: The Case of Intuitive Generosity

32 Pages Posted: 9 Oct 2014

See all articles by Maria P. Recalde

Maria P. Recalde

University of Melbourne

Arno Riedl

Maastricht University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Netspar

Lise Vesterlund

University of Pittsburgh - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 2017

Abstract

Research on public-good games reveals greater contributions by fast decision-makers than by slow decision-makers. Interpreting greater contributions as generosity, this is seen as evidence of generosity being intuitive. We caution that mistakes may lead to the observed comparative static. Varying the location of the equilibrium in public-good games with a unique dominant strategy, we find that the comparative static depends on the location of the equilibrium. Replicating existing results, we find that fast decision-makers give more than slow decision-makers when the equilibrium is below the mid-point of the strategy set. However, this comparative static is reversed when the equilibrium is above the mid-point of the strategy set. Consistent with mistakes decreasing with decision time, we find that individuals who make (or have to make) fast decisions are insensitive to incentives, more often make mistakes, and are less likely to make equilibrium contributions. The findings make clear that the rate of mistakes over time must be controlled for if one is to draw inference on preferences from response time.

JEL Classification: C920, D010, D030

Suggested Citation

Recalde, Maria P. and Riedl, Arno M. and Vesterlund, Lise, Error Prone Inference from Response Time: The Case of Intuitive Generosity (July 2017). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4987, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2507723

Maria P. Recalde

University of Melbourne ( email )

185 Pelham Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053
Australia

Arno M. Riedl (Contact Author)

Maastricht University ( email )

Department of Economics (AE1)
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Lise Vesterlund

University of Pittsburgh - Department of Economics ( email )

4T18 WW Posvar. Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/vesterlund/

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
172
Abstract Views
1,021
rank
190,014
PlumX Metrics