Nuisance

Forthcoming in ENCYLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, edited by Jürgen Backhaus, 2015

Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-60

17 Pages Posted: 11 Oct 2014

See all articles by Keith N. Hylton

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Date Written: October 9, 2014

Abstract

This essay sets out the law and the economic theory of nuisance. Nuisance law serves a regulatory function: it induces actors to choose the socially preferred level of an activity by imposing liability when the externalized costs of the activity are substantially greater than the externalized benefits or not reciprocal to other background external costs. Proximate cause doctrine plays a role in supplementing nuisance law.

Keywords: torts, law and economics, nuisance, economic theory of nuisance, nuisance law, optimum activity levels, stict liability, externalized risks, externalized benefits, background risks

JEL Classification: K00, K13, K19, K39

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., Nuisance (October 9, 2014). Forthcoming in ENCYLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, edited by Jürgen Backhaus, 2015; Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-60. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2507914

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

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