Bank Monitoring and CEO Risk-Taking Incentives
52 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2014 Last revised: 28 Jun 2017
Date Written: October 14, 2014
This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega). The results are more profound when bank lenders are more powerful and reputable and have a prior lending relationship with the borrowing firms. Additionally, Vega decreases after financial covenant violations and increases when bank lenders have offsetting equity stakes in borrowing firms. These results together suggest banks have a unique role in monitoring and shaping CEO incentives to mitigate the risk-shifting incentives of firm managers.
Keywords: CEO compensation, banks, syndicated loans, monitoring, corporate governance, loan covenants
JEL Classification: G20, G21, G30, G32
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