27 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2014
Date Written: October 14, 2014
Ancient laws addressed all types of wrongdoing with a single set of remedies that over time pursued a changing mix of retaliatory, punitive and compensatory objectives. In this paper, we consider the historical transition from retaliatory to punitive justice, and the subsequent transition from punitive to compensatory justice. This paper shows how the optimal level of enforcement varies under the three corrective regimes. Crimes that create a larger net social loss require lower levels of enforcement under retaliatory regimes. The optimal level of enforcement is instead independent of the degree of inefficiency of the crime when punitive and compensatory remedies are utilized. The paper provides several historical illustrations and sheds light on some of the legal paradoxes of ancient law.
Keywords: retaliation, optimal enforcement, deterrence, ancient law
JEL Classification: K13, K14, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Parisi, Francesco and Pi, Daniel and Luppi, Barbara and Fargnoli, Iole, Deterrence of Wrongdoing in Ancient Law (October 14, 2014). Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-38. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2510080 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2510080
By Robin West