The Citizens United Gambit in Corporate Theory: A Reply to Bainbridge on Strine and Walter

12 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2014

See all articles by David G. Yosifon

David G. Yosifon

Santa Clara University - School of Law

Date Written: October 16, 2014

Abstract

In a forthcoming article, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court Leo Strine and Nicholas Walter contribute to a growing chorus of analysts insisting that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC (2010) undermines the viability of the shareholder primacy norm in corporate theory. Professor Stephen Bainbridge has published a critique of Strine and Walter’s argument. In this brief essay, I criticize Bainbridge’s critique, and argue that the Citizens United gambit in corporate theory is indeed a compelling challenge to shareholder primacy theory.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility, shareholder primacy, shareholder wealth maximization, corporate governance, director primacy, Bainbridge, CSR

Suggested Citation

Yosifon, David G., The Citizens United Gambit in Corporate Theory: A Reply to Bainbridge on Strine and Walter (October 16, 2014). Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 4-14. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2510967 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2510967

David G. Yosifon (Contact Author)

Santa Clara University - School of Law ( email )

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States

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