Retaliatory Capital Allocation or Defensive Dual Sourcing; the Boeing Dreamliner Case

19 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2014 Last revised: 27 Jan 2015

See all articles by Michael Harper

Michael Harper

Boston University - School of Law

Date Written: October 17, 2014

Abstract

The General Counsel’s decision to file a complaint in the Boeing case was an appropriate response to a major industrial decision that posed new questions about how to resolve a central tension in the National Labor Relations Act. On the one hand, the Act protects concerted activity by employees to enhance their wages and working conditions, while, on the other hand, the Act maintains the freedom of employers to make important capital allocation decisions. Resolution of this tension requires drawing a fine line, on the basis of a series of Supreme Court decisions, between legal capital allocations that are implemented to protect the employer from the effects of future strikes, and illegal capital allocations that are implemented to retaliate against employees for engaging in past strikes in order to discourage future strikes. Illegal retaliatory capital allocations may include some that do not result in an immediate reduction of employment opportunities.

Suggested Citation

Harper, Michael Conrad, Retaliatory Capital Allocation or Defensive Dual Sourcing; the Boeing Dreamliner Case (October 17, 2014). Boston Univ. School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-63, Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 14-63, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2511363 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2511363

Michael Conrad Harper (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

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