Deciphering Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Credit Rating Disagreements

49 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2014 Last revised: 28 Oct 2016

See all articles by Samuel B. Bonsall

Samuel B. Bonsall

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Accounting

Kevin Koharki

Purdue University

Luke Watson

Villanova University

Date Written: August 28, 2015

Abstract

This study investigates the role of tax avoidance in the credit rating process and whether differences exist in how rating agencies account for the risk relevance of tax avoidance. Using a sample of initial credit ratings assigned to public debt issuances during the 1994-2013 period, our evidence is consistent with credit rating agencies assessing the costs and benefits associated with tax avoidance differently, resulting in more frequent and pronounced rating agency disagreement. Rating agency disagreement over tax avoidance is most prominent when it is accompanied by relatively high levels of uncertain tax positions, foreign activities, or research and development activities, as well as lower quality tax footnote disclosures. We also find evidence that changes in tax avoidance (tax footnote disclosures) are negatively (positively) associated with the convergence of split ratings, suggesting that firms can exacerbate or mitigate rating agency disagreement subsequent to bond issuance. Our study complements prior research by examining why sophisticated information intermediaries disagree about the risk relevance of tax avoidance and sheds light on how firms can impact rating agencies’ understanding of tax avoidance.

Keywords: tax avoidance, credit rating agencies, disagreement, uncertainty

JEL Classification: M40, G24, H20

Suggested Citation

Bonsall, Samuel B. and Koharki, Kevin and Watson, Luke, Deciphering Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Credit Rating Disagreements (August 28, 2015). Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2511454 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2511454

Samuel B. Bonsall

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Accounting ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

Kevin Koharki (Contact Author)

Purdue University ( email )

610 Purdue Mall
West Lafayette, IN 47907
United States

Luke Watson

Villanova University ( email )

800 Lancaster Ave.
Villanova, PA 19085
United States

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