Frand Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents

26 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2014

See all articles by Jay Pil Choi

Jay Pil Choi

Michigan State University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: October 21, 2014

Abstract

I develop a stylized model of court procedures that resolve disputes concerning FRAND-encumbered standard essential patents (SEPs). I analyze the effects of injunctions and potential court-imposed FRAND rates on negotiated royalty rates. The SEP-holders’ ability to hold-up is constrained by the prospect of the court-imposed license terms in case of disputes, but is not completely eliminated. Possible mechanisms to address the residual hold-up power of the SEP-holders are discussed.

Keywords: standard essential patents, FRAND, injunctions. hold-up, patent litigation

JEL Classification: K41, L24, O30

Suggested Citation

Choi, Jay Pil, Frand Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents (October 21, 2014). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2512789 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2512789

Jay Pil Choi (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

101 Marshall Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-353-7281 (Phone)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
412
Abstract Views
1,987
Rank
131,752
PlumX Metrics