A Theoretical Basis for Selective Disclosure Regulation

27 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2014

See all articles by Gill North

Gill North

Deakin University, Geelong, Australia - Deakin Law School

Date Written: 2009


The Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee (‘CAMAC’) in Australia is currently considering aspects of market integrity, including issues relating to closed or private corporate briefings to analysts. Senator Nick Sherry, the Minister for Superannuation and Corporate Law, has asked the Committee to: -examine the role that analysts’ briefings play in Australia’s financial markets, including whether their role is a positive one that leads to greater market efficiency; -advise whether changes may be required to Australia’s regulatory framework and, if so, what form they should take.

The author discusses corporate briefings and argues for policy change, including open access, in another forum. This article concerns the related debates on the role of analysts and regulation prohibiting selective disclosure. Selective disclosure is the disclosure of information by companies to selected investors, such as analysts, without disclosure to the wider public. There is no specific selective disclosure regulation in Australia. Company disclosures to analysts or other investors are only prohibited to the extent that they breach continuous disclosure or insider trading regulation.

Suggested Citation

North, Gill, A Theoretical Basis for Selective Disclosure Regulation (2009). (2009) 32 University of New South Wales Law Journal 143; UWA Faculty of Law Research Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2513144

Gill North (Contact Author)

Deakin University, Geelong, Australia - Deakin Law School ( email )

221 Burwood Highway
Burwood, Victoria 3125, Victoria 3125

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