You Can't Order Sorriness, So is there Any Value in an Ordered Apology? An Analysis of Ordered Apologies in Anti-Discrimination Cases

Abstract

People wanting an apology for a legal wrong do not typically look to the law to achieve this. The law has traditionally regarded apologies as a social and moral act that is outside the realm of enforceable legal remedies. Although the common law recognises that apologies may be appropriate and may mitigate the loss resulting from wrongdoing, there is a clear and understandable reluctance to exercise judicial power to compel wrongdoers to apologise if they are unwilling to do so voluntarily. A multitude of concerns surround ordering someone to apologise. How can we know if a person is sorry if he or she does not offer an apology voluntarily? Is there any value in an apology if you can’t order sorriness? Is an apology that is not given freely and willingly an apology at all? There are also concerns stemming from the coercive nature of the order, which is enforceable by contempt proceedings, and about interference with the defendant’s freedom of expression.