The Moonlighting Game An Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution

Posted: 22 Sep 2001

See all articles by Klaus Abbink

Klaus Abbink

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Elke Renner

University of Nottingham

Abstract

We introduce the moonlighting game. Player A can take money from or pass money to player B, who can either return money or punish player A. Thus, our game allows to study both positively and negatively reciprocal behaviour. One-shot experiments were conducted with and without the possibility of making non-binding contracts beforehand. We find that retribution is much more compelling than reciprocity. Although contracts are not binding they increase trust, but we do not find evidence that they also encourage reciprocity.

Keyword(s): Reciprocity; Retribution; Fairness; Non-binding contracts

JEL Classification: C78, C91, D63, J41, K42

Suggested Citation

Abbink, Klaus and Irlenbusch, Bernd and Renner, Elke, The Moonlighting Game An Experimental Study on Reciprocity and Retribution. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 42, No. 2, June 1, 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=251374

Klaus Abbink (Contact Author)

University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )

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Bernd Irlenbusch

London School of Economics & Political Science - Department of Management ( email )

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London, WC2A 2AE
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+44 (0)20 7955 6887 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/management/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Germany

Elke Renner

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

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