Collective Redress Procedures – European Debates

(2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 379-409

Posted: 23 Oct 2014

See all articles by Duncan Fairgrieve

Duncan Fairgrieve

British Institute of International and Comparative Law ; Université Paris Dauphine

Geraint Howells

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

Collective redress mechanisms for consumer claims seek both to allow legal systems to accommodate mass litigation without being overwhelmed and to enable litigation to be viable where individual claims would not be economic. The article maps a number of recent reforms and reform proposals relating to consumer collective redress at national level and comments on EU developments. It notes that there is insufficient recognition of the differences between schemes geared at managing mass litigation as opposed to those aimed at facilitating otherwise non-viable claims. There are however signs that a European style of collective redress procedure is developing, which emphasize the role of public authorities and consumer organizations as gatekeepers to collective redress. The EU is unlikely to be able to impose collective redress procedures on national civil procedures, but the EU could prompt Member States to reflect on the need for national reforms. There may be limited scope for an EU mechanism to address the problem of individually non-viable consumer claims. This would however have to address certain fundamental issues such as the opt-out mechanism, cy-près distribution and funding if consumer organizations are to be encouraged to bring such actions. At a legal doctrinal level, it is interesting to note the influence of comparative studies on policy development within Member States as well as at the EU level.

Keywords: European law, Consumer law

JEL Classification: K41, K42

Suggested Citation

Fairgrieve, Duncan and Howells, Geraint, Collective Redress Procedures – European Debates (2009). (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 379-409 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2513868

Duncan Fairgrieve

British Institute of International and Comparative Law ( email )

Charles Clore House
17 Russell Square
London WC1B 5JP
United Kingdom

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Geraint Howells (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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