Documenting the Deal: How Quality Control and Candor Can Improve Boardroom Decision-Making and Reduce the Litigation Target Zone

Forthcoming, The Business Lawyer

Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center Discussion Paper No. 794

53 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2014 Last revised: 31 Oct 2014

See all articles by Leo E. Strine Jr.

Leo E. Strine Jr.

Harvard Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2014

Abstract

This article addresses what legal and financial advisors can do to conduct an M&A process in a manner that: i) promotes making better decisions; ii) reduces conflicts of interests and addresses those that exist more effectively; iii) accurately records what happened so that advisors and their clients will be able to recount events in approximately the same way; and iv) as a result, reduces the target zone for plaintiffs’ lawyers.

Keywords: Mergers, Acquisitions, Corporate Law, corporate governance, Delaware, plaintiffs lawyers, securities litigation, financial advisors, conflicts of interests

JEL Classification: G30, G34, G38, K20, K22, K40, K41

Suggested Citation

Strine Jr., Leo E., Documenting the Deal: How Quality Control and Candor Can Improve Boardroom Decision-Making and Reduce the Litigation Target Zone (October 2014). Forthcoming, The Business Lawyer. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2514520

Leo E. Strine Jr. (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1563 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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