College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals

80 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2014

See all articles by José-Raimundo Carvalho

José-Raimundo Carvalho

Federal University of Ceara

Thierry Magnac

Toulouse School of Economics; University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Qizhou Xiong

Said Business School, University of Oxford

Abstract

We evaluate a simple allocation mechanism of students to majors at college entry that was commonly used in universities in Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s. Students first chose a single major and then took exams that select them in or out of the chosen major. The literature analyzing student placement, points out that this decentralized mechanism is not stable and is not strategy-proof. This means that some pairs of major & students can be made better off and that students tend to disguise their preferences using such a mechanism. We build up a model of performance and school choices in which expectations are carefully specified and we estimate it using cross-section data reporting choices between two medical schools and grade performances at the entry exams. Given those estimates, we evaluate changes in selection and students' expected utilities when other mechanisms are implemented. Results highlight the importance of strategic motives and redistributive effects of changes of the allocation mechanisms.

Keywords: education, two-sided matching, school allocation mechanism, policy evaluation

JEL Classification: C57, D47, I21

Suggested Citation

Carvalho, José-Raimundo and Magnac, Thierry and Xiong, Qizhou, College Choice Allocation Mechanisms: Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8550, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2514743

José-Raimundo Carvalho (Contact Author)

Federal University of Ceara ( email )

Rua Papi Júnior 1225 - Rodolfo Teófilo
Fortaleza, Ceara 60431970
Portugal

Thierry Magnac

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France

University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allee de Brienne bat. F
Toulouse Cedex, F-31000
France

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Qizhou Xiong

Said Business School, University of Oxford ( email )

Park End Street
Oxford, OX1 1HP
Great Britain

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
41
Abstract Views
448
PlumX Metrics