Professionals and Students in a Lobbying Experiment Professional Rules of Conduct and Subject Surrogacy

Posted: 22 Sep 2001

See all articles by Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters

Tilburg University - CentER

Frans van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

Lobbying is studied in a series of signaling game experiments. Students as well as professional lobbyists are used as subjects. In contrast with some earlier studies, comparing students and professionals, we find significant differences in the behavior of the two subject pools. Professional subjects appear to behave more in line with the game--theoretic predictions, display a higher degree of separation, and earn more money. We show that professional rules of conduct and professionalization can explain these differences. Although our results suggest that subject surrogacy is a relevant issue in this field of research, arguments are provided why experimentation with student subjects remains useful to study lobbying.

Keyword(s): Lobbying; Experimental game theory; Professional rules of conduct; Subject surrogacy

JEL Classification: C72; C90; D72; D82; M14

Suggested Citation

Potters, Johannes (Jan) J. M. and van Winden, Frans, Professionals and Students in a Lobbying Experiment Professional Rules of Conduct and Subject Surrogacy. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 43, No. 4, December 1, 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=251479

Johannes (Jan) J. M. Potters (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - CentER ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 90153
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+31 13 466 8204 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Frans Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB) ( email )

Roetersstraat 18
CREED
Amsterdam 1018 WB
Netherlands
+31 20 525 4126 (Phone)
+31 20 525 5283 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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