Information Revelation in Procurement Auctions with Two‐Sided Asymmetric Information

17 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2014

See all articles by Nicola Doni

Nicola Doni

University of Florence - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche

Domenico Menicucci

Universita' degli Studi di Firenze

Date Written: Winter 2014

Abstract

A buyer needs to procure a good from one of two suppliers offering differentiated products and with privately observed costs. The buyer privately observes the own valuations for the products and (ex ante) decides how much of this information should be revealed to suppliers before they play a first score auction. Our main result is that the more significant is each supplier's private information on the own cost, the less information the buyer should reveal. We also examine the buyer's incentives to make untruthful announces.

Suggested Citation

Doni, Nicola and Menicucci, Domenico, Information Revelation in Procurement Auctions with Two‐Sided Asymmetric Information (Winter 2014). Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 23, Issue 4, pp. 952-968, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2514917 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12075

Nicola Doni (Contact Author)

University of Florence - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ( email )

Florence 50127
Italy
++39 055 4374905 (Fax)

Domenico Menicucci

Universita' degli Studi di Firenze ( email )

via delle pandette 9
Firenze, 50127
Italy
+39-055-4374666 (Phone)
+39-055-4374913 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.dmd.unifi.it/index.php?loc=personal&id=d.menicucci

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
191
PlumX Metrics