Committees with Leaks

14 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2014

See all articles by Saptarshi Ghosh

Saptarshi Ghosh

Shiv Nadar University

Jaideep Roy

Economics Department, University of Bath

Date Written: October 27, 2014

Abstract

We analyse the quality (informativeness and efficiency) of advice obtained from a committee of careerist experts where voting is secret but voting profiles are 'leaked' with an exogenously given probability. We show that fully informative voting is generically possible only when the common prior is not too informative, the committee uses the unanimity rule and faces the possibility of leakage. It is then shown that informativeness and efficiency are mutually exclusive properties of expert committees.

Keywords: Leakage, Career Concerns, Informative Voting, Welfare.

JEL Classification: D02, D71, D80

Suggested Citation

Ghosh, Saptarshi and Roy, Jaideep, Committees with Leaks (October 27, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2515228 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2515228

Saptarshi Ghosh

Shiv Nadar University ( email )

NH-91, Village- Chithera, Tehsil-Dadri,
Dist. Gautam Buddha Nagar, UP
Gautam Buddha Nagar, Uttar Pradesh
India

Jaideep Roy (Contact Author)

Economics Department, University of Bath ( email )

Claverton Down
Bath
Bath, BA15AY
United Kingdom

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