Partner Selection Supports Reputation-Based Cooperation in a Public Goods Game

6 Pages Posted: 29 Oct 2014 Last revised: 18 Dec 2014

See all articles by Daniele Vilone

Daniele Vilone

Italian National Research Council (CNR) - Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC)

Francesca Giardini

Italian National Research Council (CNR) - Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC)

Mario Paolucci

Italian National Research Council (CNR) - Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC)

Date Written: October 27, 2014

Abstract

In dyadic models of indirect reciprocity, the receivers’ history of giving has a significant impact on the donor’s decision. When the interaction involves more than two agents things become more complicated, and in large groups cooperation can hardly emerge. In this work we use a Public Goods Game to investigate whether publicly available reputation scores may support the evolution of cooperation and whether this is affected by the kind of network structure adopted. Moreover, if agents interact on a bipartite graph with partner selection cooperation can thrive in large groups and in a small amount of time.

Keywords: Evolution of cooperation, Public Goods Game, Network, Reputation

Suggested Citation

Vilone, Daniele and Giardini, Francesca and Paolucci, Mario, Partner Selection Supports Reputation-Based Cooperation in a Public Goods Game (October 27, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2515292 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2515292

Daniele Vilone (Contact Author)

Italian National Research Council (CNR) - Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC) ( email )

Viale Marx 15
Roma, RM 00137
Italy

Francesca Giardini

Italian National Research Council (CNR) - Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC) ( email )

Viale Marx 15
Roma, RM 00137
Italy

Mario Paolucci

Italian National Research Council (CNR) - Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC) ( email )

Via Palestro, 32
Roma, RM 00185
Italy

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