Rights to the Realm: Reconsidering Western Political Development

American Political Science Review 109(4) 2015: 725-734

30 Pages Posted: 29 Oct 2014 Last revised: 29 Dec 2015

See all articles by Alexander William Salter

Alexander William Salter

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business; American Institute for Economic Research

Date Written: March 18, 2015

Abstract

I explore how political property rights to revenues from governance relate to generality norms in governance. I do so by examining the rise of Western constitutional liberalism from the perspective of property rights economics and political economy. While it is true that Western political development has been the result of bargains between political elites (Congleton 2011), the implications of the fact that parties to these bargains historically were “owners of the realm” have been underappreciated. I argue the unintended consequence of these political bargains among “owners of the realm” was a de facto supermajority rule, approaching conceptual unanimity for those party to the bargains. In developing this argument I elaborate on the relationship between political and economic property rights, noting that while they were and will continue to be intertwined, there was a hierarchy of rights that became inverted over the course of elites’ constitutional bargains.

Keywords: Congleton, constitutional bargains, generality norm, liberalism, property rights, shareholder state

JEL Classification: D72, H82, N44, P14, P16

Suggested Citation

Salter, Alexander William, Rights to the Realm: Reconsidering Western Political Development (March 18, 2015). American Political Science Review 109(4) 2015: 725-734. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2515349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2515349

Alexander William Salter (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )

Lubbock, TX 79409
United States

HOME PAGE: http://awsalter.com

American Institute for Economic Research

PO Box 1000
Great Barrington, MA 01230
United States

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