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The Uncertain Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Wage Secrecy

13 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2001  

Li Gan

Texas A&M University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: September 2000

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce uncertainty into Akerlof and Yellen (1990)'s fair wage effort hypothesis. In this uncertain fair wage hypothesis, employers do not have perfect information concerning an employee's perception of a fair wage, but assume the perceived fair wage is distributed as a random variable with a known distribution. Our wage model, built on this hypothesis, can be applied to analyze the widely adopted policy of wage secrecy.

Keywords: Uncertainty, Fairness, Wage Secrecy

JEL Classification: J3

Suggested Citation

Gan, Li, The Uncertain Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Wage Secrecy (September 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=251584 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.251584

Li Gan (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University - Department of Economics ( email )

5201 University Blvd.
College Station, TX 77843-4228
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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